



Opaque and Inaccessible: International Donor Aid Funding to Palestine 2017-2021





Palestinian NGO's Network - PNGO

**Opaque and Inaccessible:
International Donor Aid Funding to Palestine,
2017-2021**

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Abstract

Over \$45 billions of international donor aid has been spent in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 1993. This funding is disbursed with limited oversight or control by Palestinians, despite having tremendous influence over their governing structures and daily lives, in a fractured and aid dependent economy under Israeli military rule. Fundamentally, Palestinians need to understand where that funding is coming from, how much is being spent, and what it is being spent on, to exercise control over their own systems of governance, sovereign interests, and general well-being. As such, this study was commissioned to provide an overview of international donor funding in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for the years 2017-2021, focusing on 41 notable donor actors, either countries or multilateral organisations, who shape Palestinian aid and account for a vast majority of the spending. What we discovered was a distinct lack of aid transparency, which was noticeably worse compared to similar past surveys carried out by the researchers on this study. The clear lack of aid transparency and donor unreadiness, inability, or unwillingness to provide the researchers with the necessary data to understand what is being funded in Palestine is concerning. It raises questions about any donor commitment to aid effectiveness and reflects a deeper structural deficiency in the modality of Palestinian aid that needs to be urgently revisited and reinvented.

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Executive Summary

In an aid-reliant economy like that of the Occupied Palestine Territory (OPT) where external funding has an outsize influence on determining institutional priorities and what aspects of society get funding, it is vital for Palestinians to understand *who* is funding *what*, and how this affects their daily lives through programming, services, and governance. Knowing these basic facts is the starting point for effective development aid. It is only through access to this information that Palestinians can understand the funding patterns that shape their lives, their government, and the services they receive, and determine how their economy is structured and who benefits from it. It is only through access to this information that they can claim ownership over their own needs and actual priorities, and eventual governance over their own society.

This is particularly acute in light of the failure of over \$45 billion in donor funding that has been spent in the OPT since 1993, to support a peace process with Israel, but has instead coincided with and seemingly contributed to a precipitous decline in Palestinian well-being, territorial integrity, economic independence, and prospects for peace with and autonomy from Israel. Against this backdrop, this research study investigated what funding has been disbursed by international donors in the OPT from 2017 to 2021, to then analyse how it is being spent and get a sense of whether it is meeting actual Palestinian needs.

The study's objectives included compiling how much money donors are spending on OPT foreign aid, noting what type of programming the funding is being directed toward, analysing if that programming matches Palestinian priorities, and assessing to what extent Palestinians are exercising ownership over their funding. The study focused in its analysis on 41 donor actors, either countries or multilateral organisations, that we estimated, based on past donor funding analysis, would represent a vast majority of funding directed to OPT Palestinians in the 2017-2021 period.

As such, the study approached data collection in three ways:

- A. Approaching the donors and their missions directly for information about their aid funding, through signed and stamped official letters sent by email from the Palestinian NGO Network;
- B. Reviewing donor websites and cataloguing online reports of their Palestine funding details;
- C. Carrying out an extrapolation of data sets from the OECD QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics) database, looking for an assessment of the 41 donor actors' overall official development aid for 2017 to 2021.

Fundamentally, this study was testing to what extent aid data was readily available in a highly complicated aid environment, with foreign actors operating in the OPT from around the world without any central oversight or coordination by Palestinians. We were attempting to put some order to that chaos by creating a single updated map of foreign aid funding patterns, through analysis of the 41 donor actors, for the years 2017-2021. This information is intrinsic to Palestinians having control over

their own budgets, in order for them to be able to engage in good governance, develop their own institutions, manage their own affairs, and build their own state.

For this data collection and analysis to take place, we would need to be able to access information by donors about what they are funding in the OPT. Four key observations emerged:

1. Only a small minority of the 41 donor actors were ready, able, or willing to provide us (the Researchers and PNGO network) with the data necessary to understand what they, and the international community, are funding in Palestine.
2. The data available on the donor actor websites could be quite challenging to locate, took an incredible amount of time to navigate, and did not meet our needs for transparency and ease of access in creating a map of donor funding in the OPT.
3. Despite its limitations, the QWIDS database is helpful as a way to triangulate other data and understand at a higher level what donors are spending in the OPT. Still, a lack of depth of details does mean it is a limited tool to understanding Palestine aid, offering little sense of how money is being spent and to what ends. We further found many of the donor actors were not listed in the database.
4. It would take a substantial amount of time and much expanded research survey to collect the data we need for a complete overview of international donor aid in the OPT for the 2017-2021 period. This means that the aid information is very inaccessible to the Palestinians, who need to understand it to maintain control over it, for that aid to be effective.

Across the three different methods of data collection we employed, we only found limited, easily accessible information for each. The aid data was in fact so difficult to find and collect that it impeded our ability to carry out the analysis we initially planned to do and reshaped this study itself. That is, we initially anticipated being able to mostly develop an overall map of OPT Palestinian aid just through use of the QWIDS database and outreach to the donors, with limited time spent researching their online presence. We assumed this based on our past research mapping OPT Palestinian aid, and the fact that nearly all, if not all, the 41 donor actors have committed to principles of aid effectiveness in the OPT,¹ and principles of supporting the development of Palestinian institutions, sovereign leadership, and systems of good governance. We expected then to carry out an analysis of donor spending, after developing that initial map. Instead, we had to carry-out a large-scale scoping of the 41 donor actors' web presence in search of data, which we found still only offered limited results.

This reflects a lack of donor actor transparency and represents a noticeable degradation compared to past data collection and analysis carried out by the lead researchers on this survey, as recently as 2017/18. The lack of donor actor transparency and their unreadiness, inability, or unwillingness to provide us (the researchers and PNGO network) with substantive data necessary to understand what they are funding in Palestine, meant we were unable to meet our initial research objectives.

¹ OECD, 'The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action', 2008, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>

This is concerning and raises questions about the credibility of donor commitment to aid effectiveness in Palestine and the future of Palestinian governance and well-being. This reflects a deeper structural deficiency in the modality of aid to Palestine that needs to be urgently revisited and reinvented. Meanwhile, donors should respond to Palestinian civil society requests for information about their aid; this is vital to proper financial transparency, and important for supporting Palestine civil society and good governance practices. While donors may feel they are doing Palestinians a favour, it is their inaction on solving the politics of Palestine-Israel peace and protecting Palestinian human rights that contributes to the violent status quo, with Palestinians left aid-reliant and regional stability constantly at threat. They have responsibilities they are clearly not meeting toward Palestinians in the OPT.

List of Abbreviations

AECID	The Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
AGCI	Chilean International Cooperation Agency
AGCID	Chilean Agency for International Cooperation for Development
AICS	Italian Agency for Development Cooperation
AU	Australian Dollar
BCG	British Consulate General
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DKK	Danish Krone
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid
EDRIS	The European Disaster Response Information System
EU	European Union
EUPOL COPPS	The EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGP	Grant for Grassroots Projects
GIZ	The German Agency for International Cooperation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOK	Norwegian Krone
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PA	Palestinian Authority
PNGO(N)	Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (Network)
QWIDS	Query Wizard for International Development Statistics
RSSP	Relief and Social Services Programme
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEK	Swedish Krona
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO	The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WBG	West Bank and Gaza
WFP	World Food Programme

Introduction and Context

The goal of this research study is to provide an overview of international donor funding to the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) for the years 2017-2021. The study focuses on 41 notable donor actors, either countries or multilateral organisations, that we estimated, based on past funding analysis,² would represent a vast majority of funding directed to Palestinians in that period.

The study's objectives include understanding what type of programming the funding is being directed toward, if that programming matches Palestinian priorities, and to what extent Palestinians are exercising ownership over their funding. This was done with the knowledge that since the Oslo Peace Process got underway in 1993, Palestinians have often been dependent on external financial flows to pay for many aspects of their governance, and at times to sustain their economy.

The start of the Oslo Process marked the beginning of large-scale international donor investment into Palestinian development programming.³ In theory, this funding was meant to be a positive investment encouraging Palestinians to take part in peace talks with Israel. It was also meant to help the Palestinians to develop a modern economy and the liberal democratic institutions that Western policymakers considered crucial to sustain it. There was a strong sense among Western donors that the Palestinians needed to be 'caught up' to Israelis on a developmental level, but that this would require a fundamental re-organisation of Palestinian state, society, and economy. There was also an underlying prejudice by the donor community that the Palestinians were more prone to violence because they were not a developed and Western society like Israel, adding impetus to the need to develop Palestinians for peace.

The development programme created for Palestinians was designed by the World Bank and donor funding has been guided by the Bank ever since.⁴ The programme's ideological underpinnings can be traced to precepts found in 'modernisation' theory; a viewpoint that was popular in the West after Europe's colonial empires collapsed during decolonisation following World War II. The basic tenants of this viewpoint were that the problems the Global South faced could be traced to the inherent traditionalism, or 'backwardness', in those societies. This held them back and for that reason the traditional cultures needed to be fundamentally

² Alaa Tartir and Jeremy Wildeman (2016) Mapping of Donor Funding to The Occupied Palestinian Territories 2012 – 2014/15: Limited, Disorganized and Fragmented Aid Data Undermining Transparency, Accountability and Planning, AidWatch Palestine, Available at <https://alaatartir.com/2017/11/10/mapping-of-donor-funding-to-the-occupied-palestinian-territories-2012-2014-15/>; Jeremy Wildeman, 'Donor Aid Effectiveness and Do No Harm in the Occupied Palestinian Territory' (Aid Watch Palestine, 10 December 2018), http://www.aidwatch.ps/sites/default/files/resource-field_media/Aid%20Effectiveness%20%26%20Do%20No%20Harm%20in%20OPT-%20Final-compressed_1.pdf

³ Anne Le More (2008) International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money, Routledge, London.

⁴ Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir (2013) Can Oslo's Failed Aid Model Be Laid to Rest?, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, Available at, <https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/can-oslos-failed-aid-model-be-laid-rest/>

reformed, including by inculcating political stability and the growth of science, both of which would be helped along by capital investment like foreign aid.⁵

Modernisation theory typically put the onus for development on Global South societies, like Palestine. In the process, Europeans operated oblivious to and ignorant of the rapacious damage caused by colonialism and the extent of the wealth stolen through colonialism to help fuel the development of Western society.⁶ In this ontological tradition, the onus was put on the Palestinians to reform while donors largely operate oblivious to Israel's colonialism in the OPT and the harm it is doing to Palestinians and how development aid has been structured toward meeting Israel's developmental needs, at the expense of Palestinians.

Despite over \$45 billion in donor investments in aid since 1993, this aid model not only failed to contribute to peace but was spent concurrent to a precipitous decline in Palestinian overall well-being, territorial integrity, economic independence, and prospects for peace with and autonomy from Israel.⁷ Instead, Israel's occupation of the OPT and colonisation of Palestine became further entrenched and the Palestinian economy further structured to meet the needs of Israel's ongoing development and the growth of its illegal settlements under international law.⁸ Israeli control over the OPT has ensured Palestinian businesses are not able to compete fairly with Israeli equivalents, constantly ceding market share. Palestinians have no control over any borders, and all trade is directed through Israel, allowing Israel to control and hold back significant amounts on financial transfers. Meanwhile, in this uncompetitive environment Palestinians suffer large annual balance of account deficits that need to be made up by cash inflows from outside sources, like international aid. That becomes aid money that should be invested in development but ends up de facto being invested – directly and indirectly – into Israel's economy.⁹

This money is, however, particularly crucial for an economy like Gaza that has been under siege and cut off from the world for fifteen years, suffering significant destruction through a series of conflicts with the Israeli military.¹⁰ At one point, the United Nations estimated Gaza would become effectively uninhabitable by 2020, and indeed life there is extremely hard.¹¹ Other regions like East Jerusalem and Area C in the occupied West Bank require funding to offset some of the losses suffered through the loss of land, infrastructure, businesses, and

⁵ Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, Reprint edition (New York: The New Press, 2008), 65.

⁶ Prashad, 65–66.

⁷ Are John Knudsen and Alaa Tartir (2017) Country Evaluation Brief: Palestine, CMI and Norad, Available at <https://alaatartir.com/2017/06/23/country-evaluation-brief-palestine/>

⁸ Mandy Turner, ed. (2019) *From the River to the Sea: Palestine and Israel in the Shadow of "Peace"*, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD.

⁹ Alaa Tartir, Tariq Dana, and Timothy Seidel (2021) *Political Economy of Palestine: Critical, Interdisciplinary, and Decolonial Perspectives*, Political Economy of Palestine: Critical, Interdisciplinary, and Decolonial Perspectives.

¹⁰ Sara Roy (2016). *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development*. 3rd ed, Institute for Palestinian Studies, Washington, DC.

¹¹ United Nations News Service Section, 'UN News - Gaza Could Become Uninhabitable in Less than Five Years Due to Ongoing "de-Development" – UN Report', *UN News Service Section*, 1 September 2015, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51770#.V9E9I7V4IE6>.

homes, because of the growth of Israeli settlements. In general, underdevelopment and instability caused by violence through conflict is the norm for Palestinians.

In an aid-reliant economy like that of the OPT, it is vital for Palestinians to understand who funding is what, and how this affects their daily lives through programming, services, and governance. This is in fact the starting point for effective development aid, a notion that in recent decades has found growing recognition even among Western donors who acknowledge that aid recipients often know best how their development should be carried out, and should anyway be empowered if real development is to take place.

This concept of ownership by recipients over their own aid has in fact been acknowledged by most Western states. In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, the first of its five fundamental principles is ‘Ownership’, where developing countries should be able to set their own strategies for poverty reduction, to improve their institutions, and to tackle corruption. Another is ‘Harmonisation’, where donor countries are expected to coordinate, simplify procedures, and share information to avoid duplication. By 2008, the Accra Agenda for Action reiterated the importance of ‘Ownership’, where it was expected that countries should have more say over their development processes through wider participation in development policy formulation, stronger leadership on aid co-ordination, and more use of country systems for aid delivery. Accra also calls for ‘Inclusive partnerships’, with full participation by all partners, including donors in the OECD Development Assistance Committee and developing countries, as well as other donors, foundations, and civil society. These are only made possible if there are clear and transparent funding systems whose information is easily accessible to recipients.

Only through access to this information can Palestinians understand the funding patterns that affect the most basic parts of their lives, their government, the services they receive, and their economy. It is only through access to this information that they can claim ownership over their own development and eventually governance over their own societies.

Methodology

This study focuses on 41 notable donor actors, either countries or multilateral organisations, active in the OPT that we estimated made up the largest tranche of funding directed to Palestinians from 2017 to 2021.¹² The methodology for this study was designed in collaboration between Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO) and the researchers, Dr Alaa Tartir and Dr Jeremy Wildeman. The study built on our past and ongoing analysis of Palestinian aid, and we approached data collection in three ways, to expand and triangulate findings.

I. Approaching the Donors and their Missions

The first step was approaching the donors directly for information about their aid funding with signed and stamped official letters, sent by email from PNGO by their Senior Policy Advisor.

PNGO unites and represents the leading, oldest, and most prominent civil society organizations and NGOs in Palestine, currently numbering over 140 institutions. These emails were sent in the spirit of donor accountability and aid transparency. It has now long been recognised that for aid to be effective, recipients should have ownership over their own funding, and this starts with accessibility to information about those sums.

PNGO is a civic and democratic gathering and coordination framework that strives to support, consolidate, and strengthen Palestinian civil society, based on principles of democracy, social justice, rule of law, tolerance, and respect of human rights, and sustainable development. Given its stature and the organisations it represents, PNGO is a type of organisation that seemingly should elicit forthcoming responses by international donors interested in their aid being effective and in supporting Palestinian good governance.

When reaching out to the donors, PNGO stated it had hired two external researchers, Dr Alaa Tartir and Dr Jeremy Wildeman, to conduct a study that aims to track external donor funding to Palestine and Palestinian institutions and civil society organisations, between the years 2017 and 2021. The letter (email) of enquiry asked the donors to collaborate with PNGO in this policy-driven research by taking a moment to provide us with some of their information and data on aid to Palestine and Palestinian institutions and organizations, for those years.

The letter noted that this research is crucial for PNGO, its members, and their operations and strategic plan as it offers them solid, evidence-based analysis that informs their policy intervention, short-term priorities, and long-term objectives.

¹² Alaa Tartir and Jeremy Wildeman (2016) Mapping of Donor Funding to The Occupied Palestinian Territories 2012 – 2014/15: Limited, Disorganized and Fragmented Aid Data Undermining Transparency, Accountability and Planning, AidWatch Palestine, Available at <https://alaatartir.com/2017/11/10/mapping-of-donor-funding-to-the-occupied-palestinian-territories-2012-2014-15/>; Wildeman, ‘Donor Aid Effectiveness and Do No Harm in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.

Information we were looking for in their responses included:

1. Amount of aid their organisation/institution/government offered and gave to Palestinians in the OPT between 2017 and 2021, per year. This included asking specifically for the differentiation between how much was committed and how much was eventually disbursed, per year.
2. Geographical distribution of their aid across the OPT between 2017 and 2021, such as in the West Bank (Areas A, B, or C), Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.
3. Information on the sectoral allocation of their aid between 2017 and 2021, asking if it was: developmental, humanitarian, direct budget support to the Palestinian Authority (PA), security and governance, co-existence and people to people programs, civil society organisation, or some other designation.
4. Profile of the recipients of their aid between 2017 and 2021, including the percentage and amount of aid allocated to PA governmental bodies, Palestinian non-governmental or other local Palestinian bodies, or other international bodies.
5. How much of their annual aid, in absolute terms and in terms of percentage, was directed toward or granted to Palestinian NGOs and civil society organizations between 2017 and 2021. We asked in which sectors/fields those NGOs worked, and if they expect an increase or decrease of their aid to Palestinian NGOs and civil society organizations in the near future.

II. Donor Websites Online

Second, we reviewed the donor websites and online reports for Palestine funding details. For each of the 41 donor actors we searched for and catalogued the following information, when available:

1. The name of the donor and a weblink to the information about their Palestine aid funding
2. The amount of funding they spent on Palestine aid 2017-2021
3. Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding? If so, what are they?
4. How detailed is the information they provide online, as compared to the information we sought out when approaching them by letter/email.
5. How easy was the information to find?

III. OECD QWIDS Database

Third, we carried out an extrapolation of data sets from the OECD QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics) database, looking for an assessment of their overall official development aid for 2017 to 2021.

Data A - Donor Responses

The research project model was designed between January and March 2022. As part of the data sampling, between April 18 and September 20, 2022, Senior Policy & Communication Advisor from the PNGO Network approached 41 donors for information about their Palestine aid programming. He sent signed and stamped official letters by email, a sample of which can be found in *Appendix A*. As described in the methodology, the letter requested information about the specificities of each donor's programming. As already explained, this information should be freely available and accessible to Palestinian civil society, if donors are interested in supporting Palestinian liberal democratic practices, institution building, good governance, and ownership over their own aid process, as prescribed by the OECD backed norms in aid effectiveness.¹³

If a donor did not respond after our first approach to them, the PNGO advisor followed up with a second attempt, and occasionally more over the course of 5 months. Throughout, PNGO advisor was in touch with the lead researchers who were reviewing the data he collected, approach to outreach, and methodological coherence.

The results of this outreach effort are described in the chart below and in the notes that follow. Note, 'x' denotes no data, so either an approach was not made, or no response received.

#	Name of Donor (Organization/Institution/ Government)	Date of Contact - Email/ Letter sent	Replied to Email (Yes/No)	Reminder email sent	Replied to Email (Yes/No)	Date of Response Received	Data Provided
1	Algeria	28/4/2022	no	23/5/2022	no	x	no
2	Australia	27/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no
3	Belgium	20/4/2022	no	26/5/2022 (no response) & 6/9/2022	Yes	06/09/2022	Yes
4	Brazil	25/4/2022	no	08/09/2022	no	x	no
5	Canada	18/4/2022	no	23/5/2022 (no response) & 6/9/2022	Yes	7/9/2022	no
6	Chile	26/4/2022	no	08/09/2022	no	x	no
7	China	27/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no
8	Denmark	25/4/2022	no	x	Yes	18/7/2022	Yes
9	EU - The Office of the European Union Representative	18/4/2022	no	23/5/2022	no	x	no
10	EUPOL COPPS- EU Mission for the Support of	27/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	Yes	26/5/2022	Yes

¹³ OECD, 'Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action', Multilateral Institution, OECD, accessed 4 August 2016, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>

#	Name of Donor (Organization/Institution/ Government)	Date of Contact - Email/ Letter sent	Replied to Email (Yes/No)	Reminder email sent	Replied to Email (Yes/No)	Date of Response Received	Data Provided
	Palestinian Police and Rule of Law						
11	Finland	27/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no
12	France	20/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no
13	Germany	21/4/2021	no	6/9/2022	Yes	8/9/2022	no
14	India	27/4/2022	no	24/5/2022	no	x	no
15	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	27/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	Yes	26/5/2022	Yes
16	Italy	26/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no
17	Representative Office of Ireland	25/4/2022	no	08/09/2022	no	x	no
18	Japan	21/4/2022	Yes	x	x	24/4/2022	Yes
19	Kuwait	28/5/2022	no	23/5/2022	no	x	no
20	Malta	26/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no
21	The Middle East Quartet	28/4/2022	Yes	x	x	29/4/2022	Yes
22	The Netherlands	25/4/2022	no	08/09/2022	no	x	no
23	Norway	25/4/2022	Yes	6/9/2022 to get additional information	Yes	4/5/2022 & 12/9/2022	Yes
24	Qatar	27/5/2022	no	08/09/2022	no	x	no
25	Russia	26/4/2022	no	08/09/2022	no	x	no
26	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	28/4/2022	no	23/5/2022	no	x	no
27	South Africa	26/4/2021	no	06/09/2022	no	x	no
28	South Korea	26/4/2022	no	08/09/2022	no	x	no
29	Spain	25/4/2022	Yes	x	x	04/05/2022	Yes
30	Sweden	25/4/2022	Yes	x	x	29/4/2022	Yes
31	Switzerland	25/4/2022	no	08/09/2022	no	x	no
32	Turkey	25/4/2022	no	06/09/2022	no	x	no
33	United Arab Emirate	28/4/2022	no	23/5/2022	no	x	no
	United Kingdom (UK)	25/4/2022	no	06/09/2022	Yes	27/6/2022	Yes
34	UK - Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)	28/4/2022	no	23/5/2022 & 6/9/2022 & 19/9/2022	Yes	20/9/2022	Yes
35	UN OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory	18/4/2022	no	No reminder sent *	no	x	no
36	UNDP – United Nations Development Programme	25/4/2022	no	sent one time only *	no	x	no

#	Name of Donor (Organization/Institution/ Government)	Date of Contact - Email/ Letter sent	Replied to Email (Yes/No)	Reminder email sent	Replied to Email (Yes/No)	Date of Response Received	Data Provided
37	UNRWA- Jerusalem and Gaza offices	28/4/2022	no	No reminder sent *	no	x	no
38	UNSCO - The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	27/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no
39	United States - USAID	18/4/2022	Yes	x	x	25/4/2022	Yes
40	The World Bank	20/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no
41	Venezuelan Representative Office in Ramallah	27/4/2022	no	26/5/2022	no	x	no

Notes A

Overall, there was a very poor response rate by donors, with only 14 donors (or 34%) – highlighted in the table- responding after multiple requests for information, and only 12 (or 29%) providing some form of information.

In the above chart/table, a ‘no’ response for the category ‘Replied to Email’ meant there was no response whatsoever. In the case of Canada, a response did not lead to data being shared with the research team, despite multiple interactions, until outside the period of research. We will note that the data they eventually provided was comprehensive, but since a major component of this study is to measure accessibility to the data, it is important to note the difficulty in attaining it. In the case of Germany, they described how ‘unfortunately’ they do not have a comprehensive overview over the figures we were asking for that they could provide us with.¹⁴ The data collected from Germany’s websites in Data B Section of this report does indicate why they might refer to this information being quite complicated. Again, that ultimately means this information is quite inaccessible to Palestinians.

As we already noted, the IMF described how it provided only technical support in the OPT. However, it is an important actor and has long played a significant role as a guide in shaping the Palestinian economy and governance, and for this reason it is important to monitor and assess its activities. After about a month and two attempts at outreach, the IMF provided information.

Neither UN-OCHA nor the UNDP followed up on our first request for information. We chose to only send one letter of enquiry, because they have information on their websites. In the case of UN-OCHA, we also understand it was a period of some turmoil as its Director, Sarah

¹⁴ They did offer to host Dr Tartir and Dr Wildeman, to provide an overview of their engagement in Palestine. However, that went outside the scope of this research exercise.

Muscroft, was forced to leave the office to work from Turkey, following a tweet that was interpreted as being biased against Palestinians.¹⁵

In the case of France, a major and historical donor, the email ‘bounced’. PNGO advisor reached out to a staff member at the mission, who he had worked with previously, but to no avail at collecting a response.

A handful of donors responded relatively quickly, within about a business week, with relatively accessible information. This included Japan, Norway, Sweden, Spain, and the United States (USAID).

In a rare case, Japan took time to answer some of the questions in our letter, in their April 24 email. There they noted they do not have a classification for the geographical distribution of their aid across the OPT for the years 2017 and 2021. They noted their assistance is mainly disbursed through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and UN-Agencies, while ‘less amount’ is given through a Grant for Grassroots projects (GGP) scheme. GGP is the only scheme that is granted to international and local NGOs in Palestine.

Japan also sent a sheet that explains its support to Palestine, noting that ‘the year in the attached year’ refers to the Japanese fiscal year from April to March of the next year (not a calendar year). This sheet is in Appendix B of this report.

On May 4, Norway first directed us to a website (norad.no) to find information about Norwegian aid to Palestine under Statistics - Palestine. In response to a follow-up request, on September 12, Norway provided further data about Norway’s support to Palestine from 2017 to 2021. They noted how their categories do not exactly correspond to what we requested in our letter of enquiry, but that this is what they were able to extract from their system. It is listed in Appendix C of this report.

Spain responded relatively quickly but with inaccessible information. As they wrote, the kind of information requested in the PNGO study should be requested by submitting the request through their official transparency portal: https://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/en/transparencia_Home/index.html. They also wrote that, in any case, all the information is available in <https://infoaod.maec.es/>, which compiles detailed statistical data. However, this appear to *only be available in Spanish*.

On April 25, Sweden noted in an email that they have an open governmental portal for all development cooperation aid worldwide: <https://openaid.se/en>. They noted you can search for all the parameters that we mentioned in our letter, except for the geographical distribution in the OPT, for which they do not keep data.

¹⁵ Jacob Magid, ‘Senior UN Official Loses Her Post after Tweet Condemning PIJ Rocket Fire at Israel’, *Times of Israel*, 13 August 2022, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-un-official-loses-post-after-tweet-condemning-pij-rocket-fire-at-israel/>.

In addition, we had an interaction with a major Swedish NGO called Diakonia that is active in the OPT. They noted in an April 29 email that the Swedish Minister of Finance took a decision without precedent. Based on estimates that around 80,000 refugees from Ukraine were expected to arrive that year in Sweden, important percentages of the funds for international cooperation previously allocated to the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had been frozen. At the time of the email, they noted Sida will be the most affected as the funds for bilateral contracts have already been disbursed by the MFA through Swedish Embassies and in total Sida must freeze about 30% of their overall budget. This will most likely affect the funds Swedish NGOS (SWENGOS) receive in Palestine, which in turn will affect their Palestinian partners. This was expected to happen even if they already have signed contracts. Appendix D offers a breakdown of the effect of that anticipated freeze.

USAID, representing United States aid programming, referred us to their website, ForeignAssistance.gov. They noted the website collects data in a standardized format as reported, that there may be slight delays in the figures reflected, and that there may be additional details about funding that are not available on the site.

The Quartet responded quickly, within several days. They noted they do not themselves provide funding to Palestinian organisations but were interested to receive our research results upon completion.

EUPOL COPPS referred us to their website after a month and two outreach attempts: <http://eupolcopps.eu/>

The UK diplomatic mission and FCDO were contacted separately. On June 27, outreach to the UK led to a response from the FCDO describing UK aid contributions. This is listed in Appendix E. The response included a description of how the UK's development programmes in the OPT works to preserve the prospect of a negotiated Two State Solution and improve the lives of Palestinians, in line with the UK's longstanding position. It described the importance of building the capability of Palestinian Institutions to maintain the viability of a Two State Solution and work with the PA to improve its financial management and security sector. .

On September 20, and in response to a separate letter of enquiry, FCDO / the British Consulate General (BCG) noted that its support to the OPT for 2017 to 2021 is published and can be accessed through the Development Tracker DevTracker Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (fcdo.gov.uk). 5

Denmark eventually responded on July 18, after a two-month wait, with data listed in Appendix F. Denmark also noted that between 2017-2021 they committed and disbursed 56 million DKK for CSOs, all of which were Human Rights CSOs. They added that, 'unfortunately', further disaggregation and classification of Danish support to Palestine will require significant time and effort.

After several months of outreach, Belgium responded with an overview of the financing to Palestinian NGOs, but for the 2022-2027 period.

Findings A

Only a small minority of donors were ready, able, or willing to provide us (the Researchers and PNGO network) with substantive data necessary to understand what they, and the international community, are funding in Palestine.

Very few donor actors directly answered our five questions. Most of the donors who responded to our emails with information directed us to imperfect websites, which could be difficult to navigate. We see this in the Data B section of this report.

As a most egregious case of aid information online being inaccessible to Palestinian stakeholders, Spain's online portal was in Spanish only.

In the case of Denmark and Germany, their responses suggested to us that the level of transparency in their aid may be affected by limitations in reporting, such as available staff time, resources, and/or interest in tracking, recording, and providing easily accessible information that is both detailed and simple to understand.

Overall, the limited number of responses we received provided little information to the five questions we asked in each approach. Getting a sense of geographical spending was particularly difficult, and we received essentially next to no useful information from the data collection process of directly approaching the donors.

The approach we took in this part of data collection should have been simple for donors to at least respond to, in support of local ownership, democratic institution building, and transparency in aid. Even imperfect responses are better than none.

On its own, this form of data collection did not lead to a comprehensive dataset. It took significant time and resources and researchers with advanced degrees and knowledge of both local and international systems and institutions, just to get limited results. It should be noted that PNGO and the two lead researchers are particularly familiar with the donor aid context in the OPT, and still they faced these challenges.

With that said, this data set did provide an important part of the overall aid picture. It demonstrated that one of the most direct and, in theory, best ways to get aid data was essentially an inaccessible route.

Data B – Donor Websites

We reviewed the foreign ministry and government aid agency websites, whenever available, for each of the 41 donor actors in our survey to collect information on their OPT aid spending. We sometimes found other official sources of information online. We dedicated up to several hours per donor, if necessary, looking for the following information:

1. The name of the donor and a weblink to the information about their Palestine aid funding
2. The amount of funding they spent on Palestine aid 2017-2021
3. Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding? If so, what are they?
4. How detailed is the information they provide online, as compared to the information we sought out when approaching them by letter/email.
5. Was the information easy or difficult to locate?

We catalogued and recorded what we found in this exercise.

An overview of the results follows.

Donor Web Information – The data was collected 2022 September 21-29									
#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
1	Algeria	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information			Difficult
2	Australia	AU\$43.8 million	AU\$38.3 million	AU\$42.6 million	AU\$29.8 million	AU\$29.8 million	Yes. Australia provides humanitarian aid and development assistance to the ‘Palestinian Territories (PTs)’ in alignment with their long-standing support for the Middle East peace process. Australia's assistance claims to contribute to stability and inclusive economic growth in the ‘PTs’. Australian says its aid equates to 0.4 per cent of the PTs Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and they align their support with the PA's objectives and other donors’ funds to ensure impact.	The Australian government publishes detailed accounts of their aid to Palestinian territories in the annual ‘Aid Program Performance’ reports. These are available on Department of Foreign Affairs' website in PDF and Word format.	Easy
3	Belgium	roughly €27 million	roughly €27 million	€25.7 million	€24 million	€5 million	Yes. Belgium describes the priority objective of Belgian Development Cooperation as sustainable human development. It says it must achieve this objective by reducing poverty and inequity within a context of partnerships. It says it must also generate and increase the Belgian public's support for North-South solidarity and for their cooperation policy. The Sustainable Development Goals, the principle of leaving no-one behind, and the humanitarian commitments through the grand bargain are central elements of their policy. The new cooperation Portfolio 2022-2026 was	The Belgian projects are fairly well described on the ODA-tracker provided by Belgian Development Cooperation. The information it includes are budget, background, target, and purpose.	Easy

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
							signed on 2022 March 9 th for €70 million and consists of two important pillars: ‘Youth Empowerment’ through improved education and entrepreneurship for youth’ and ‘Climate and Environment’.		
4	Brazil	\$3,800,000 to UNRWA	<i>Not clear</i>	<i>Not clear</i>	\$75,000 for Covid19 to UNRWA	\$75,000 to UNRWA emergency appeal	No. The data we accessed was through UNRWA reporting		Difficult
5	Canada	No information, but \$19,748,031 to UNRWA	No information, but \$26,746,123 to UNRWA	No information, but \$18,618,549 to UNRWA	No information, but \$24,083,407 to UNRWA	No information, but \$27,614,551 to UNRWA	Yes. Canada states its international assistance in the West Bank and Gaza reinforces the goal of a two-state solution and is aligned with Palestinian needs and Canadian priorities. Canada says it supports efforts to help advance the peace process, promote security and the rule of law, stimulate economic growth, and deliver humanitarian assistance.	The projects are well described but once you click on them the financial information is not there for many of them. We were able to find reliable data from UNRWA on Canada’s funding to it.	Difficult
6	Chile	\$22,500 to UNRWA	\$62,500 to UNRWA	\$12,500 to UNRWA	No information	\$12,500 to UNRWA	AGCI is Chilean development agency, but it is challenging to find information about Palestine there. Representación de Chile ante el Estado de Palestina mentions a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1996, a Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Chilean Agency for International Development Cooperation (AGCID) and the Palestinian International Cooperation Agency (PICA) in 2019, a MOU between the Ministries of Health of Chile and the Palestinian National Authority, a MOU on Economic Cooperation and a MOU on	Other than the summary mentioned, no data was found on Chilean government websites. The data we provided is from UNRWA reports. The Chilean aid agency supplies an incomplete 80-word, one-page Word document on their cooperation agreements with Palestine: https://www.agci.cl/centro-de-documentacion2/documentos-agcid	Difficult

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
							Cultural Cooperation. Chile notes, 'Among those mentioned, without a doubt, the most relevant to date has been the agreement on health, which has favoured the development of a successful medical program. It consists of sending medical missions to Palestine that perform surgical interventions on children in poverty. Lately, the NGO Palestinian Children Relief Fund (PCRF) is the one that has coordinated and financed the trip of the national specialists. However, in its beginnings, the Fundación Belén 2000 was also involved'.		
7	China	No information \$350,000 to UNRWA	Not clear \$2,350,000 to UNRWA	No information \$1,000,000 to UNRWA	Not clear \$3,291,904 to UNRWA	Not clear \$2,040,920 to UNRWA	No. There is no data on the Chinese foreign ministry website. UNRWA shows China as a donor but with donation of Covid19 medical and health supplies it is hard to find a precise figure for China's aid to Palestine.	Data accessed from UNRWA reports.	Difficult
8	Denmark	124,385,838 DKK	125,077,056 DKK	76,381,130 DKK	105,109,214 DKK	102,493,496 DKK	Denmark's Representation in Ramallah is responsible for Denmark's humanitarian and development assistance in Palestine. According to their website, their main areas of focus are on: Human rights and democratic accountability; Green, sustainable, and inclusive economic growth and decent jobs; Resilience, peace and stability; and Humanitarian assistance, including support for UNRWA. The Openaid website offers a breakdown of funding by	Clear, detailed, and accessible information about projects can be found on https://openaid.um.dk/	Easy

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
							category of programming type, such as Peace and Security, and agriculture. You can find percentages of disbursements by project, organisation, or sector.		
9	EU - The Office of the European Union Representative	<i>Not clear</i> , they list only ECHO funding annual totals: €138,140,913	<i>Not clear</i> , they list only ECHO funding annual totals: €150,189,717	<i>Not clear</i> , they list only ECHO funding annual totals: €150,189,717	<i>Not clear</i> , they list only ECHO funding annual totals: €201,324,692	<i>Not clear</i> , they list only ECHO funding annual totals: €210,054,367	Yes, UNRWA, OCHA, and ECHO	The information on ECHO spending is fairly detailed through research in the EDRIS system. The other funding information is not clear	Difficult
10	EUPOL COPPS-Ramallah	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information	The mission is focused on security and justice sector reforms. But no data on their website is available as to how the budget is spent annually. The Mission claims it forms part of the wider EU effort to support Palestinian state building, in the context of working towards a comprehensive peace, based on a two-State solution.	No data found on their website. The Mission budget for the year 2022-23 indicated as €11.6 million.	Difficult
11	Finland	€4.06 million in development aid and €4,500,000 to UNRWA	€6.24 million in development aid and €4,500,000 to UNRWA	€5.89 million in development aid and €5,000,000 to UNRWA	€8.06M in development aid and €9,000,000 to UNRWA	€7.85 million in development aid and €8,000,000 to UNRWA	Yes. There is a breakdown of funding by category of programming type, such as Education, Government and Civil Society, strengthening the status and rights of women and girls, climate change and natural resources, and humanitarian aid. This is available on the Finnish Foreign Ministry's website for the period 2021-2024. (https://finlandabroad.fi/web/pse/finland-s-development-cooperation-in-country) For 2017-2020, the only data found on the website was PDFs of Finland's Humanitarian Aid for each year:	Once you find the website https://openaid.fi/ , you see details of all activities and projects for each year, including priorities, percentages of disbursements by sector, and recipient organisations.	Easy

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
							https://um.fi/humanitarian-aid According to the Foreign Ministry's website, Finland's development cooperation in the 'Occupied Palestinian Territory' safeguards education that is inclusive and of high quality, contributes to inclusive state-building and supports strong civil society. It also claims to strengthen the resilience of those Palestinian communities in the most vulnerable situations. Finland states its support focuses on the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a whole, with a particular emphasis on Area C and East Jerusalem in the West Bank, and on Gaza. https://um.fi/development-cooperation-palestinian-territory		
12	France	Roughly €26.3 million in Development Aid and \$9,613,390 to UNRWA	Roughly €37.4 million in Development Aid and \$15,261,693 to UNRWA	Roughly €69.2 million in Development Aid and \$45,924,606 to UNRWA	Roughly €24.4 million in Development Aid and \$22,986,067 to UNRWA	Roughly €19.4 million in Development Aid and \$27,958,309 to UNRWA	Yes. According to France's ministry of Foreign Affairs, France's support for Palestinian economic development and institutions aims to preserve the viability of the future Palestinian State. As such, France has put in place: Direct budget support of €16 million annually to the Palestinian Authority, actively contributing to building the institutions of the future Palestinian State. Data by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD, French Development Agency), shows that aid is focused primarily on water and sanitation, agriculture and food security,	It is hard to navigate and extract data from The Agence Française de Développement (AFD, French Development Agency)'s website: https://opendata.afd.fr/ . The data, including project names, their description, budget information, etc., can be extracted in various file formats. A person familiar with Excel and French language had to sort the data by date to find the total of	Difficult

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
							infrastructure and urban development and health. The AFD finances municipalities, private sector as well as French NGOs with projects aimed at building the capacities of local civil society stakeholders; Humanitarian aid and assistance for Palestinian refugees, via UNRWA. Given the financial difficulties facing UNRWA, France announced exceptional support measures, bringing its contribution to the Agency up to €40 million in 2019. France and the Palestinian Authority signed a grant agreement in 2018 (€15 million), to support the acquisition of French equipment by Palestinian SMEs. Also see: https://www.afd.fr/en/page-region-pays/palestine	development aid for each year. We gave up trying to find France's data on humanitarian assistance to Palestine and relied on UNRWA reports.	
13	Germany	Not clear, very complicated \$76,468,714 to UNRWA	Not clear, very complicated \$177,439,447 to UNRWA	Not clear, very complicated \$169,924,991 to UNRWA	Not clear, very complicated \$210,384,339 to UNRWA	Not clear, very complicated \$176,979,810 to UNRWA	No. There is just a list of programming without an overarching direction on the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) website. GIZ publishes detailed project data on its website. For Palestine it shows 77 total projects of which 30 are ongoing. You can filter results by sector or financier. You cannot filter or sort by date. You have to click on all 77 projects to see the start date of each.	The projects have limited details which are further hard to understand out-of-context.	Difficult
14	India	\$1.25 million to UNRWA	\$42.1 million in project assistance and \$5 million to UNRWA	\$30 million in budget support and \$5 million to UNRWA	\$5 million to UNRWA	\$5 million to UNRWA	The Representative office of India in Ramallah provides a short history of India-Palestine relations and lists the Government of India's developmental projects in Palestine.	The list of projects on the government website only includes the name of the projects and the budget for each. Figures regarding UNRWA support were	Difficult

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
								accessed from UNRWA reports.	
15	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	Does not provide funding	Does not provide funding	Does not provide funding	Does not provide funding	Does not provide funding	Yes. For instance, while the IMF cannot provide financial support to ‘West Bank and Gaza (WBG)’, because it is not a member state, it has been providing policy advice in the macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial areas since 1994.	Technically that advice might be considered to have an In-Kind valuation of developmental aid, though this is not offered.	Moderate
16	Italy	Not clear, but there appears to be €11.8 million to UNRWA	€ 27,196,087	€ 22,993,363	€ 15,848,731	€ 25,023,028	Yes. The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) Jerusalem has a website devoted to explaining Italy's aid to Palestine.	Openaid AICS provides clear detailed information regarding Italy's spending in each sector.	Easy
17	Representative Office of Ireland	over €11 million	€15.38 million	€ 22 million	€ 17.2 million	No information	Yes. There are specific details with lists of what programming is being funded	IrishAid annual reports provide by sector breakdowns of their aid spending.	Easy
18	Japan	Not clear \$43,373,337 to UNRWA	Not clear \$44,999,224 to UNRWA	Not clear \$43,438,361 to UNRWA	Not clear \$33,080,021 to UNRWA	Not clear \$50,510,511 to UNRWA	No. There is a 3-page PDF on Japan's ministry of foreign affairs website describing Japan's assistance to the Palestinians, which is not detailed.	No annual report found on Foreign Ministry's website. Data accessed from UNRWA.	Difficult
19	Kuwait	No information \$9,000,000 to UNRWA	No information \$50,000,000 to UNRWA	Not clear \$5,000,000 to UNRWA	No information	Not clear \$11,500,000 to UNRWA	No. The Kuwait Fund website shows no projects in Palestine	Data accessed from UNRWA.	Difficult
20	Malta	Not clear, though we found \$35,294 spending for the Humanitarian Fund for the occupied Palestinian	Not clear	Not clear	Not clear	Not clear	No. The only data accessed from UN OCHA report.		Difficult

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
		territory (oPt HF) according, to UN OCHA							
21	The Middle East Quartet	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information	The Quartet, set up in 2002, consists of the UN, EU, US, and Russia. Its mandate is to help mediate Middle East peace negotiations and to support Palestinian economic development and institution-building, in preparation for eventual statehood.	No information	Difficult
22	The Netherlands	€23.19 million	€20.96 million	€26.32 million	€23.81 million	€29.35 million	Yes. The Netherlands Development Aid Portal shows the government's budget and number of activities in each sector in Palestine.	The portal is easy to access and offers detailed information about its activities in Palestine.	Easy
23	Norway	NOK 583.8 million	NOK 636.8 million	NOK 615.9 million	NOK 628.6 million	NOK 693.9 million	Yes. According to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its financial contribution to PA includes budget support, aims to build the institutional foundation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and to ensure a sustainable economic basis for a future independent Palestinian state. Norwegian objectives through development cooperation in Palestine include state-building, democratic development and good governance, high quality service delivery, the reconstruction of Gaza, peace and reconciliation processes, and human rights including gender rights and equality. Norway says it prioritizes long-term development cooperation in the areas of education, health; energy; and good	NORAD is the Norwegian Development Aid agency whose website offers detailed country-specific statistics.	Easy

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
							governance through civil society, multilateral actors, and governmental partners. In addition, Norway provides humanitarian assistance to Palestine. The humanitarian efforts of the organizations its supports are particularly focused on areas where the PA are unable to meet the population's needs for basic services, respectively, in Gaza, East Jerusalem, and in the 'so-called' Area C (areas under Israeli control in the West Bank).		
24	Qatar	Not clear \$1,000,000 to UNRWA	Not clear \$51,499,779 to UNRWA	Not clear \$41,720,520 to UNRWA	Not clear \$8,000,000 to UNRWA	Not clear \$17,000,000 to UNRWA	No. The annual reports produced by the Qatar Fund do not specifically discuss Qatar's priorities in Palestine. They simply list ongoing projects.	The Qatar Fund publishes annual reports in Arabic, French, and English with details about ongoing projects in each country. However, it is not clear how much is spent annually, meaning it was difficult to locate relevant information for this research. Humanitarian aid to UNRWA accessed from UNRWA reports.	Difficult
25	Russia	\$2 million to UNRWA	\$2 million to UNRWA	\$2 million to UNRWA	\$2 million to UNRWA	\$2 million to UNRWA	No. The data we collected was from UNRWA reporting.	Data accessed from UNRWA.	Difficult
26	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	No information \$53,275,000 to UNRWA	No information \$159,956,771 to UNRWA	No information \$49,536,960 to UNRWA	No information \$28,933,333 to UNRWA	No information	No. There is no mention of Palestine or West Bank and Gaza in their annual reports.	There are no details. Data accessed from UNRWA reports.	Difficult
27	South Africa	\$792,253 to UNRWA	No information	No information	No information	No information	No. The data accessed was from UNRWA reporting.	Data accessed from UNRWA.	Difficult

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
28	South Korea	Not clear \$720,000 to UNRWA	Not clear \$1,608,850 to UNRWA	Not clear \$786,260 to UNRWA	Not clear \$1,164,611 to UNRWA	Not clear \$1,190,230 to UNRWA		Data accessed from UNRWA	Difficult
29	Spain	€400.000 through UNRWA, €1 million to the EU's PEGASE mechanism+ finalization of the disbursement of €36 M approved for the 2014-2017 period (no further details)	Not clear	€11,693,814	€11,621,062	Not clear	No. The Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) provides annual reports, but they do not seem to be consistent in reporting specific data on Palestine. PDFs available are in Spanish only.	"Anexo de datos" documents were only available for years 2019 and 2020. Documents are in Spanish and only show the percentage of disbursements for each sector, not details of projects.	Difficult
30	Sweden	SEK 372.71 million	SEK 546.7 million	SEK 489.39 million	SEK 543.42 million	SEK 603.54 million	Yes. Sida details important thematic areas of Sweden's support in Palestine in clear terms.	Openaid.se provides detailed information about aid disbursements in Palestine and other countries.	Easy
31	Switzerland	Not clear, very complicated \$27,179,767 to UNRWA	Not clear, very complicated \$27,828,599 to UNRWA	Not clear, very complicated \$26,089,972 to UNRWA	Not clear, very complicated \$29,529,812 to UNRWA	Not clear, very complicated \$31,648,928 to UNRWA	The Swiss Confederation website describes bilateral relations with the 'oPt' and priorities in the region.	The Swiss Confederation website also lists Swiss projects in the 'oPt'. However, data is not easy to find for each year and there are no annual reports.	Difficult
32	Turkey	Not clear \$6,733,650 to UNRWA	Not clear \$18,774,000 to UNRWA	Not clear \$11,099,308 to UNRWA	Not clear \$20,561,025 to UNRWA	Not clear \$20,471,544 to UNRWA		Turkey's state-run aid agency 'The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)' provides data	Difficult

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
								from their annual reports which is available on their website tika.gov.tr . Reports are only available for 2017 to 2019. They describe the projects but not figures. Data accessed from UNRWA reports.	
33	United Arab Emirates	\$ 117.4 million	\$ 247.2 million	Not clear \$51,800,000 to UNRWA	Not clear \$1,000,000 to UNRWA	No annual report for this year	Yes. The UAE provides annual foreign aid reports in English.	UAE Annual Foreign Aid Reports do not have a consistent format for describing aid. For the years 2017 and 18, aid to Palestine and a few other countries is clearly described, but not in following years. For annual reports in 2019 and 2020, in addition to the government, there are several UAE donors listed, and finding the total sum of the UAE's foreign aid to Palestine requires finding each donor's contribution.	Difficult
34	United Kingdom (UK)	See FCDO	See FCDO	See FCDO	See FCDO	See FCDO	See FCDO	See FCDO	See FCDO
	UK - Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)	Not clear, but it states a £54m planned budget	Not clear, but it states a £64m planned budget	Not clear \$76,259,850 to UNRWA	Not clear \$64,129,434 to UNRWA	Not clear \$40,104,619 to UNRWA	Yes. The FCDO says its programme in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) is supporting the UK's Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) policy by building Palestinian institutions and promoting economic growth, as well as providing humanitarian assistance	FCDO's development tracker lists closed and active projects in the OPTs. It is difficult to ascertain precise annual disbursements from what is available on the website.	Difficult

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
		\$67,014,302 to UNRWA	\$92,754,569 to UNRWA					There are also multiple documents on the UK Gov website about Statistics on International Development. There are multiple files for each year. It is challenging to find the right information. Data accessed from UNRWA reports.	
35	UN OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory	\$11.7 million to the Gaza Strip (74 per cent) and West Bank (26 per cent)	Gaza \$10.8 million and West Bank \$3.3 million.	Gaza \$19.5 million and West Bank \$7.9 million	Gaza \$24.7 million and West Bank \$9.5 million	Gaza \$23.6 million and West Bank \$3 million	Yes. OCHA publishes annual reports providing an overview of activities and achievements.	Full project details, financial updates, real-time allocation data, and indicators of achievements against targets are available at gms.unocha.org/bi .	Easy
36	UNDP – United Nations Development Programme	Budget \$113.07 million	Budget \$96.27 million	Budget \$78.81 million	Budget \$57.70 million	Budget \$84.58 million	Yes. The UNDP Transparency Portal suggests the focus of the agency is on eradicating poverty in all its forms.	The portal shows the top donors, the budget, the expense, and how much is spent in each sector. The portal also has detailed information on all projects.	Easy
37	UNRWA- Jerusalem and Gaza offices	Gaza: \$529,558.00; West Bank: \$163,329.70	Gaza: \$489,337,000 ; West Bank: \$156,822,000	Gaza: \$488,180,000 ; West Bank: \$145,580,000	Gaza: \$457,571,000 ; West Bank: \$150,769,000	No information (report not published or available at time of data collection for this study)	Yes. They have a clear mandate to provide support and services for Palestinian refugees. Each year a breakdown is provided for programming priorities including education, health, Relief and Social Services Programme (RSSP), infrastructure, Executive Direction, protection, support, and microfinance.	The annual reports on programming are quite detailed, including breakdowns for areas of operations in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.	Easy

#	Name of Donor (Organization / Institution/ Government)	Funding in 2017	Funding in 2018	Funding in 2019	Funding in 2020	Funding in 2021	Do they state the focus or priorities of that funding online?	How detailed is the information they provide online?	Was the information easy to find?
38	UNSCO - The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information	No data. Only socioeconomic reports on their website		Difficult
39	United States - USAID	\$380M	\$270M	\$120M	\$18M	Obligations: \$130 million	Yes. They break funding down by program categories like Economic Growth and Recovery, Health and Covid-19 Response, Youth Empowerment, Democracy and Governance, Water and Sanitation, Vulnerable Populations, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution.	The information available is fairly detailed, offering a breakdown of programme descriptions.	Easy
40	The World Bank	Not clear	Not clear	Not clear	Not clear	Not clear	No. The World Bank has established trust funds to support the PA, such as the Palestinian Recovery and Development Plan Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and Palestinian Partnership for Infrastructure Trust Fund. However, Data on disbursements is not clear.		Difficult
41	Venezuelan Representative Office in Ramallah	No information	No information	No information	No information	No information		No data on the official website. Venezuela is not listed as a donor to UNRWA.	Difficult

Notes B

When looking for aid data on the 41 donor actors' websites, the research team categorised the data for 13 (or nearly a third at 32%) as easy to find, 1 (around 2%) as moderately difficult to find, and the clear majority of 27 (around two-thirds at 66%) as difficult to find.

Some donor actors stood out for their transparency and ease of access in locating information. The donor actors where it was the easiest to find data included Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UN-OCHA, UNDP, UNRWA, and the United States.

Australia publishes detailed accounts of their aid to Palestinian territories in the annual 'Aid Program Performance' reports, while the information available for the United States is fairly detailed and offers a breakdown of programme descriptions. Belgian projects are fairly well described on the Belgian Development Cooperation ODA-tracker, including information like budget, background, target, and purpose. IrishAid provides annual reports with sectoral breakdowns of their aid spending. The Netherlands Development Aid portal is easy to access and offers detailed information about its activities in Palestine. The Norwegian Development Aid agency, NORAD, website offers detailed country-specific statistics. Denmark's OpenAid platform provides clear, detailed, and accessible information about its Palestine aid projects. Italy's OpenAid AICS platform provides clear detailed information regarding its spending in each sector. Sweden's Openaid.se provides detailed information about aid disbursements in Palestine, as does Finland's openaid.fi.

Some international institutions excel at transparency in the Palestine aid context. For UN-OCHA, its website makes available full project details, financial updates, real-time allocation data, and indicators of achievements against targets. The UNDP has detailed financial and project information. UNRWA provides detailed annual reports on programming, including geographic areas of operations, in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

The one donor actor that was moderately difficult to find data on was the IMF.

Donor actors where it was difficult to find data included Algeria, Brazil, Chile, China, EUPOL COPPS, France, Germany, Japan, Kuwait, Malta, The Middle East Quartet, Qatar, Russia, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, UNSCO, World Bank, and Venezuela.

Difficulties included a range of key reasons, such as 'no information' being available or there being 'not clear' information. This was the issue with donor actors like Algeria, Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Venezuela. An example of 'no information' was when there were no annual reports available on the Japan Foreign Ministry's website, while the data for Switzerland is not very clear and complicated to navigate. The United Arab Emirates Annual Foreign Aid Reports do not have a consistent format for describing aid. While for the years 2017 and 2018 aid to Palestine is clearly described, it is not in following years.

Some international institutional donor actors do not provide aid data that is easily accessible online. There was no data on the EUPOL COPPS website, though we found the mission budget for the year 2022-23 was €11.6 million on their website. The Middle East Quartet, one of the easiest donor actors to interact with by email, has a website that is opaque and does not easily provide key information. That includes making clear if they are a financial donor to Palestinians, which we found out by email they are not. UNSCO only provides socioeconomic reports on their website. Though the World Bank is well-known for its voluminous reporting on the economic and aid outlook of the OPT, when it came to searching its website for details on its funding for programming, our research team found the data to not be clear.

In some cases, the data we accessed about donors was through other donor actor reporting and not actually available through the websites of the ones being investigated, such as with Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. For Malta, we found a very small sum spent on Palestine aid via UN OCHA's reporting. With Chile, the Chilean aid agency supplied an incomplete 80-word, one-page document. Otherwise, we turned to data from UNRWA reporting for information about Chilean aid to the OPT. UNRWA shows China is a donor, while there is no data on the Chinese foreign ministry website. UNRWA was also a source for some Canadian and Indian funding.

Some donors would describe what type of programming they were funding, but not give clear financial figures, if any at all. The Qatar Fund publishes annual reports in Arabic, French, and English with details about ongoing projects in each country, but it is not clear how much is spent annually. With Canada, while the projects are well described, once you click on them financial information is not available. Some of the EU information was easy to find on the EDRIS system, while other EU funding information was not clear. For India, the list of projects on the government website only includes the name of the projects and the budget for each, without any details.

For other donor actors, the information was confusing. For example, while the web information France provides for its programming is detailed, it can be hard to navigate the website and extract data. For Germany, there was just a list of programmes on the GIZ website without an overarching direction. The projects have limited details which are hard to understand out-of-context. Spain often provides its information only in Spanish and is not consistent in its reporting. Turkey provides irregular data with descriptions of projects but not figures. With the UK, the FCDO's development tracker lists closed and active projects in the OPT, but it is difficult to ascertain precise annual disbursements. The UK offers a confusing array of files, such that it is challenging to find appropriate and useful information.

Finally, it is worth noting that it was generally easier to find development funding spent by many donors, especially those with a development tracker, as compared with what they are spending on humanitarian aid.

Findings B

As with our direct outreach to donors found in Data A section, the data available on the donor actor websites could be quite challenging to locate, take a significant amount of time to navigate, and still not meet our information needs for creating a map of donor funding in the OPT.

We allocated up to several hours to investigate each donor actor. Considering the large number of donor actors we were investigating and two-thirds being difficult to locate information for, this represented a substantial investment of time. Even then, this approach did not lead to results for the majority of donor actors, suggesting much more time is required to try to develop a map of donor aid in the OPT 2017-2021.

It is possible that you need to speak the official language(s) of some donors to better search their website for information, such as with Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea. This appears to be the case with Spain, as an example. However, it is not realistic for Palestinians to collect information in this manner, given that their first language is Arabic, and given the sheer number of unique languages of the different donors to Palestine. English fluency is challenge enough for most Palestinians, and it is the universal language for donor aid reporting.

Were we to significantly increase the time we spent researching each donor actor, we might go through all the different reports we did find, while finding new reports, which could be used to piece-together a better overall view of the aid picture in Palestine. That would represent a very substantial amount of time per donor actor, though it would be a useful exercise as a check for Palestinians to have on what donors are doing and how they are reporting on their activities in the OPT.

Significant time could be devoted profiling each donor actor and its funding streams, such as in Wildeman's 2018 Aid Effectiveness survey of the United States, Canada, IMF, World Bank, European Union, United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Norway.¹⁶ Focusing on the years 2010-2016, that survey provided brief profiles for each donor actor, investigated their aid tranches, reviewed their reporting to understand their approach and aid goals, and included data from anonymous semi-structured interviews with personnel from the donor actors.

With so many of the donor actors in Data A and Data B providing such poor aid information, we chose for now to not compare the information they provided.

These challenges in accessing the information on OPT aid came despite this study being carried out by a very experienced team of researchers.

Overall, the aid data from donor actor websites is very inaccessible to Palestinians, or anyone for that matter.

¹⁶ In this study, that aid was assessed through aid effectiveness and do no harm lenses. Wildeman, 'Donor Aid Effectiveness and Do No Harm in the Occupied Palestinian Territory'.

Data C – QWIDS Database

As part of the triangulation of the research scoping, we carried out an extrapolation of data sets from the OECD QWIDS (Query Wizard for International Development Statistics) database – <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/> – for their assessment of overall official development aid for 2017 to 2021.

We looked for Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements for the years 2017 to 2021. This included, to start, an overall query for all Official Donors, Total, on the database. (See screenshot example, dated 2022 September 23rd.)

What type of Aid data are you looking for? [See All Datasets](#)

Hide Data Selection

Donor(s)	Recipient(s)	Flow(s)	Flow Type(s)	Sector(s)	Time Period
Official Donors, Total ☒ Official Donors, Total ☐ DAC Countries, Total ☐ Non-DAC Countries, Total ☐ Multilateral Agencies, Total ☐ Private Donors, Total Browse Donors Enter Donor:	West Bank and Gaza Strip ☐ All Recipients, Total ☐ All Developing Countries, Total ☐ All Multilateral Recipients, Total Browse Recipients West Bank and Gaza Strip	ODA ☒ ODA ☐ OOF ☐ Private ☐ Total Flows (ODA+OOF+Private) ☐ Total Official Flows Net (ODA+OOF)	Disbursements ☒ Disbursements ☐ Commitments	All Sectors, Total ☒ All Sectors, Total Browse Broad Sector Categories Browse Detailed Sector Codes	5 Selected ☐ Most recent year only (2021) 2017 to 2021 Browse Time Period

Reset All Selections

All data presented here are on a flow basis

☐ Show project-level data [commitments or gross disbursements] and/or detailed sector level data (CRS)

As late as September 23, 2022, the 2021 financial year had not yet been uploaded by donors to the QWIDS database. (See screenshot example, dated 2022 September 23rd.)

Data Results

Export As CSV

Bookmark Data

Change Data Layout

Print Data

Sector(s)	Flow(s)	Donor(s)	Flow Type(s)	Amount
All Sectors, Total	ODA	Official Donors, Total	Disbursements	Current Prices (USD millic)

Time Period	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Recipient(s)					
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2147.18	2296.11	2295.68	2033.42	..

These data are an excerpt from Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a]

[Click here to see all datasets.](#)

The results were the following funding figures, as of September 23, 2022, in \$USD millions.

Time Period	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Recipient(s)						
West Bank and Gaza Strip *	2147.18	2296.11	2295.68	2033.42	..	8772.39

* **Note**, Palestine, or the OPT, are referred to as West Bank and Gaza on QWIDS.

Of the 41 donor actors we were surveying in this study, the following are the results of inputting them in search of their reported spending, in the QWIDS database.

#	Name of Donor (Organization/Institution/ Government)	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total \$USD million
1	Algeria	x	x	x	x	x	
2	Australia	..	..	..	..	..	
3	Belgium	23.72	25.08	22.34	20.8	..	91.94
4	Brazil	x	x	x	x	x	
5	Canada	26.28	32.11	30.13	39.58	..	128.1
6	Chile	x	x	x	x	x	
7	China	x	x	x	x	x	
8	Denmark	18.69	19.68	11.3	19.02	..	68.69
9	EU - The Office of the European Union Representative	290.87	290.57	233.65	267.85	..	1082.94
10	EUPOL COPPS- EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law	x	x	x	x	x	
11	Finland	5.14	8.27	7.25	9.84	..	30.5
12	France	44.69	78.84	57.56	65.61	..	246.7
13	Germany	175.97	212.26	215.66	224.97	..	828.86
14	India	x	x	x	x	x	
15	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	..	..	..	..	..	
16	Italy	33.19	34.79	48.62	28.95	..	145.55
17	Representative Office of Ireland	6.16	6.81	12.98	9.82	..	35.77
18	Japan	46.94	48.33	52	62	..	209.27
19	Kuwait	0.86	..	63.3	..	..	64.16
20	Malta	0.04	..	0	0.01	..	0.05
21	The Middle East Quartet	x	x	x	x	x	
22	The Netherlands	26.14	24.73	29.46	27.14	..	107.47
23	Norway	70.58	78.28	70	66.78	..	285.64
24	Qatar	..	..	313.17	235.92	..	549.09
25	Russia	x	x	x	x	x	
26	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	..	..	..	..	..	
27	South Africa	x	x	x	x	x	
28	South Korea	x	x	x	x	x	
29	Spain	25.1	30.44	32.81	26.03	..	114.38
30	Sweden	60.63	61.57	51.05	57.68	..	230.93
31	Switzerland	26.29	31.76	37.28	32.24	..	127.57
32	Turkey	40.59	25.37	38.23	32.96	..	137.15
33	United Arab Emirate	108.92	240.39	110.12	14.55	..	473.98
34	United Kingdom (UK)	79.02	65.89	103.02	66.5	..	314.43
	UK - Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)	x	x	x	x	x	
35	UN OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory	x	x	x	x	x	
36	UNDP – United Nations Development Programme	1.37	1.27	1.76	2.05	..	6.45
37	UNRWA- Jerusalem and Gaza offices	521.73	438.29	437.28	449.5	..	1846.8



#	Name of Donor (Organization/Institution/ Government)	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total \$USD million
38	UNSCO - The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	x	x	x	x	x	
39	United States - USAID	332.64	269.65	68.68	20.29	..	691.26
40	The World Bank	..	..	..	..	..	
41	Venezuelan Representative Office in Ramallah	x	x	x	x	x	
		Total					7817.68

- 'x' is when the donor actor is not listed in QWIDS
- '...' is when no data is provided for that year for that donor actor

Notes C

The QWIDS database only yielded data for 24 of 41 (or 59%) donor actors we were assessing.

Significant historical donors like Australia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are for some reason not in the database for West Bank and Gaza ODA. In at least the case of Australia, however, their websites in the Data B section suggest they were funding tens-of-millions of dollars in aid.

The data provided in this database is limited by nature. The information provided by the donors is just an overview of their total ODA spending in Palestine, and does not provide any depth of details, such as we sought out with our questions in Data A and Data B sections.

The fact that just 24 of 41 donors accounted for \$7,817.68 millions of \$8,772.39 millions, or 89% of the total ODA that QWIDS recorded for the years 2017 to 2020, suggests we did make an astute choice of who to assess in this survey.

Of course, as we see with the 17 of 41 donor actors not listed here, we recognise that the overall aid spending to Palestine is likely higher than what is listed in the QWIDS database for those years.

Rather bizarrely we found Israel listed as a donor to the West Bank and Gaza as late as September 23, 2022, even though it cannot be a donor as the military occupier of those regions. (See screenshot dated September 23, 2022.)

Data Results						
Export As CSV Bookmark Data Change Data Layout Print Data						
Sector(s)	Flow(s)	Donor(s)	Flow Type(s)	Amount		
All Sectors, Total	ODA	Official Donors, Total	Disbursements	Current Prices (USD millic)		
Time Period	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	
Recipient(s)						
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2147.18	2296.11	2295.68	2033.42	..	

These data are an excerpt from Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a] [Click here to see all datasets.](#)

Note, the researchers found the QWIDS website buggy at times, which also reduced accessibility.

Findings C

Despite its limitations, the QWIDS database is helpful as a way to triangulate other data and as guide to which donors to investigate further for how they are disbursing their Palestine aid.

Still, the lack of depth of details does mean it is a limited tool to understanding Palestine aid, offering little sense of how money is being spent and to what ends. Its use is more of a complementary tool of other data sampling and analysis.

The listing of Israel as a donor does raise concern about the judgement in how the database is constructed and aid categorised. This underlines the limitations of using this tool.

The Palestinian economy is small and the ability of its government and institutions to raise funds for necessary services very limited. If at least \$8,772 billion in ODA was entering the Palestinian economy, government, and institutions for just 2017-2020, this means donor aid remains highly influential in shaping the policies and structure of institutions in Palestine.

This underlines the importance of mapping out in detail the overall aid environment and understanding how the funding is being spent, and then what its impacts are.

Recommendations

Foreign donor influence on Palestinian state and society is substantial. In the spirit of aid effectiveness , it is important for their aid to be accurately measured so that Palestinians can have the information to understand and to take ownership over their own governance, , and make sure that aid serves their actual needs.

Donor actors should allocate the resources necessary to track and make information about their aid spending in the OPT easily accessible. Currently, that is not happening and there is no system to make sure they are doing this.

All information about donor aid should be available in Arabic and English, and especially in Arabic, for maximum access by the broader Palestinian public, civil society, government, and specialists.

Donors should respond to Palestinian civil society requests for information about their aid tranches, such as when they are contacted by email by PNGO. This is vital to proper financial transparency, but also important for supporting Palestinian civil society and good governance practices.

Geographical information about aid spending is as important as information about sectoral allocations, and donors should make this information available. For instance, if there is less funding going to sensitive areas most affected by Israeli settlement building or military activities, such as in East Jerusalem or Area C of the West Bank, Palestinians should know these differentiations to react to them. Places like Area C are in acute need of aid to sustain local Palestinian communities and resist the growth of illegal Israeli settlements.

Overall, a lack of donor actor transparency for 2017-2021 represents a noticeable degradation in recent years, compared to past reports conducted by the lead researchers as recently as 2017/18. This is concerning and raises questions about any donor commitment to aid effectiveness in Palestine.

Stakeholders always have a right to sovereignty over their own aid processes even if that funding is coming from an external source. A lack of aid transparency is concerning from the perspective of Palestinians having ownership over their own programming, which is fundamental to self-government, particularly in an aid dependent economy. It is our recommendation to significantly expand the scope of this research to map out what aid is being sent to Palestine, how it is being structured, and what its impacts are. This is vital as a check on the activities of donors in the OPT to make sure foreign aid is meeting Palestinian needs and to help make sure it does no harm by funding activities that make Palestinian life and self-government worse.

While donors may feel they are helping Palestinians, it is their inaction on solving the political element of Palestine-Israel peace and protecting Palestinian human rights that contributes to the violent status quo, which leaves Palestinians aid reliant and regional stability constantly at threat. Many of these donors sponsored the now failed Middle East Peace Process and convinced Palestinians to participate in it. Some like Canada, the United State, and United Kingdom played key roles in the creation of

Israel and Palestinian Nakba in 1947-49, while most Western donors have donated substantial funds to Israel without requiring Israel recognise basic Palestinian rights. Donor aid has even been structured in such a way that it now helps Israel offset the costs of occupation and colonisation of Palestine.

Donors could be considered to have an obligation to provide effective aid funding to Palestinians after decades of failure to deliver on Palestinian self-governance, despite decades of Palestinian participation in the aid process. That includes the erosion of Palestinian territorial integrity during the Oslo Peace Process. An allocation of Palestinian aid funding that meets their actual needs, would also contribute to arresting those destructive processes.

It would be worthwhile to create a matrix with an overview of the focus and priorities of the different donors, including grouping them together thematically.

This research should be expanded to include more than 41 donor actors.

Palestinian civil society organizations (CSOs) provide humanitarian and development services in health, agriculture, and education to vulnerable communities.¹⁷ CSOs provide a necessary check on government power and input on how governing institutions should meet Palestinian real-time needs. They also play an important role in monitoring and reporting on human rights violations, consolidating their role in the national struggle and the process of Palestinian democratization, based on principles of social justice and rule of law, as well as respect for international law, international humanitarian law and human rights law. Palestinian CSOs also rely heavily on international donor funding. In recent years, alongside ongoing crises like COVID-19 and conflicts like Ukraine, funding to Palestinian CSOs has declined with severe implications on civil society.¹⁸ Funding for CSOs should be increased and maintained at a robust level until Palestinians are free to have their own state on their own autonomous land.

¹⁷ Benoît Challand (2009) *Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign Donors and the Power to Promote and Exclude*, Routledge, London; Alaa Tartir and Benoît Challand (2023) *Palestine*, 15th edition of “The Middle East” edited by Ellen Lust, CQ Press.

¹⁸ Al-Shabaka (2019) *Focus On: International Aid to Palestine*, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network. Available at <https://al-shabaka.org/focuses/focus-on-international-aid-to-palestine/>

About the Authors

Jeremy Wildeman (PhD-Exeter) is a Fellow at the Human Rights Research and Education Centre, *University of Ottawa*. He is the author of numerous publications on Middle East politics, such as *What Lies Ahead? Canada's Engagement with the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinians* (Routledge 2021), and 'EU Development Aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: between Aid Effectiveness and World Bank Guidance' (in *Global Affairs* 2018); and a lecturer of Middle East politics and government. His extensive research and writings on the topic of Palestine aid include: his University of Exeter PhD Thesis; his GCRF-ESRC postdoctoral research at the University of Bath; research consultancies for organisations such as Oxfam-GB, UN-ESCWA, AidWatch Palestine, PNGO, and Sida; as well as multiple peer reviewed journal and chapter publications. He has presented at conferences such as MESA, BRISMES, and the ISA; and has frequently appeared in media outlets such as Middle East Eye, Al-Jazeera, TRT World, Foreign Policy, Al-Shabaka, and The Conversation. He also cofounded a successful Palestinian community development and education charity in Nablus called Project Hope.

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About PNGO

The Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO) is a civic and democratic gathering and coordination framework that strives to support, consolidate, and strengthen Palestinian civil society, based on principles of democracy, social justice, rule of law, tolerance, and respect of human rights, and sustainable development. Altogether, PNGO unites and represents the leading, oldest, and most prominent civil society organizations and NGOs in Palestine, currently numbering over 140 institutions. Among the existing national platforms, it is the one with the most experience and the strongest organizational structure. In addition to coordinating the thematic networks and launching common advocacy campaigns, PNGO plays a pivotal role as a “coordination committee” among national platforms. In this framework, PNGO is supporting other networks, often as a coach.

Appendix

Appendix A – PNGO Sample letter to donors/actors

This letter to the Swedish Consulate in East Jerusalem is a sample of the letter we would send to each donor-actor.



شبكة المنظمات الأهلية الفلسطينية

The Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network

April 25th, 2022

Consul General Mr. Julius Liljeström
Sweden Consulate-General Jerusalem
generalkonsulat.jerusalem@gov.se

Subject: Request Information on Aid to Palestine and Palestinian Organizations

Dear Mr. Julius Liljeström,

The Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO) unites and represents the leading, oldest, and most prominent civil society organizations and NGOs in Palestine, currently numbering over 140 institutions. It is a civic and democratic gathering and coordination framework that strives to support, consolidate, and strengthen Palestinian civil society, based on principles of democracy, social justice, rule of law, tolerance, and respect of human rights, and sustainable development.

As part of this mission, PNGO has commissioned two external researchers and experts, Dr. Alaa Tartir and Dr. Jeremy Wildeman, to conduct a study that aims to track external donor funding to Palestine and the Palestinian organizations (including to the Palestinian civil society organizations and NGOs) between the years 2017 and 2021. This research is crucial for PNGO, its members, and their operations and strategic plan as it offers them a solid, evidence-based analysis that informs their policy intervention, short-term priorities, and long-term objectives.

We are hoping that you can collaborate with us in this policy-driven research endeavour by taking a moment to provide us with some of your information and data on aid to Palestine and Palestinian institutions and organizations for the years 2017 - 2021. In particular, we are seeking:

- The amount of aid your organization/institution/government has offered and given to Palestinians in the OPT between 2017 and 2021, per year. How much was committed, and how much was eventually disbursed, per year?
- The geographical distribution of your aid across the OPT between 2017 and 2021. Where was it given? West Bank (Areas A, B, or C) vs. Gaza Strip vs. East Jerusalem?
- The sectoral allocation of your aid between 2017 and 2021. Was it developmental, humanitarian, direct budget support to the PA, security and governance, co-existence and people to people programs, civil society organization, or some other designation?
- The profile of the recipients of your aid between 2017 and 2021. Percentage and

رام الله - المصايف - شارع أميل توما - عمارة زهرة المصايف ط-1، - بالقرب من بنك فلسطين، ص.ب. 2232، رام الله - فلسطين، هاتف: 972 2 2975320/1، فاكس: 972 2 2950704

Ramallah - Palestine /Al Masayef - Amile Touma Street - Zahrat Al Masayef Building - First -1 floor- / P.O. Box: 2232, Tel: 970 2 2975320/1. Fax: 970 2 2950704

Website: <http://www.pngo.net>



amount of aid allocated to PA governmental bodies, or Palestinian non-governmental, or other local Palestinian bodies, or other international bodies?

- How much (in absolute terms and in terms of percentage) of your annual aid is directed toward or granted to Palestinian NGOs and civil society organizations between 2017 and 2021? In which sectors/fields do these NGOs work? Do you expect an increase or decrease of your aid to Palestinian NGOs and civil society organizations in the near future?

We truly look forward to hearing from you in this collective effort to generate a more rigorous and comprehensive set of data on OPT aid that helps in informing aid policies, mapping and tracking aid flows over the past four years and reforming the current aid framework and modality.

Your participation is crucial for the success of this research project, and we would like to thank you in advance for your collaboration with us. We would truly appreciate it if you can kindly reply positively to our request and share with us your data, information and insights within **two weeks of receiving this letter**, by replying to this email/letter. Also, please feel free to copy the two lead researchers, Dr. Tartir and Dr. Wildeman as I am sure they would be delighted to hear from you and answer any questions you might have. Their email addresses are atartir@gmail.com and jeremy.wildeman@gmail.com

Finally, we will certainly share with you the findings of our research and discuss the results further once the study is ready. Thank you, once again, for your time, interest, and collaboration.


Yours Sincerely,

Samer Daoudi, Policy Adviser

On behalf of the research team and the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network



Appendix B – Summary of Japan’s Assistance to the Palestinians



2021/12/更新中(単位:万ドル)

備考 ←今回追記部分

注：1995年の一般プロジェクト無償には、パレスチナ評議会選挙に係る物的支援80万ドルを含む。
注：拠出額については円貨でのみ公表されている場合、該当年度支出官レートを適用（H26年度以降、それ以前は1ドル＝100円計算）。千ドル単位を四捨五入。
注：補正予算による拠出は、斜自体。（H27年度以降）

Appendix C - Information about Norway's support to Palestine 2017-2021.

NOK (' million)																		
Year	Total Amount	SECTORAL											PA				INGOs	Local NGOs
		budget support	education	health	energy	water and sanitation	conflict resolution	Human rights	gender	culture	Employment	Emergency response/rec onstruciton and relief/disaste	Education	Culture	Gender	Total	Total	total
2017	583,799	235,000	65,022	35,208	57,563	7,000		11,729	15,638	11,000		39,581	25,000	7,100		33,443	113,242	25,899
2018	637,079	150,000	96,814	39,970	71,976	6,000		9,593	7,699	7,100		148,695	35,000	3,208		39,425	136,770	25,068
2019	615,892	160,000	116,634	46,006	56,878	600	20,475	15,986	12,185	10,600	15,000	111,522	55,000	5,476		62,118	225,597	35,493
2020	628,859	100,000	74,312	114,897	51,222		13,928	32,553	12,344	19,303	30,000	97,283	35,000	7,103	100	44,204	137,134	37,473
2021	693,850	155,000	130,789	61,464	30,385		11,588	30,788	14,680	8,350	35,000	120,320	85,000	4,996		92,297	145,205	33,820
Total	3,159,479	800,000	483,571	297,545	268,024	13,600	45,991	100,649	62,546	56,353	80,000	517,401	235,000	27,883	100	271,487	757,948	157,753

Appendix D - Information received from Diakonia

The information received at the Swedish NGO Diakonia about the sum of frozen funds at Sida and decrease in percentage in the different sectors of cooperation.

Swedish government instruction to Sida april 2022	Original budget	Frozen by Gov (april)	Decrease in %
Some examples budgetlines	Mil SEK		
Information and communication (frame)	155	55	35%
Civsam frame	1 955	750	38%
Asien (ram)	1 900	610	32%
Latinamerica (ram)	840	270	32%
Afrika (ram)	8 000	1 730	22%
Human rights, democracy international law (frame)	1 000	420	42%
Middle east North Africa	1 460	465	32%
Gender			50%

Appendix E – Response from FCDO on UK funding and policy positions

June 27, 2022, response by the FCDO regarding UK funding and policy positions.

PNGO Communications

communications@pngo.net

Dear PNGO Communications,

Thank you for your email of 23 May to Foreign Secretary about Request Information on Aid to Palestine.

The UK's development programmes in the OPTs work to preserve the prospect of a negotiated Two State Solution and to improve the lives of Palestinians throughout the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, in line with the UK's longstanding position.

The UK recognises the importance of building the capability of Palestinian Institutions to maintain the viability of a Two State Solution and will continue to work with the PA to improve its financial management and security sector. UK economic development programming works with the Palestinian Authority and Government of Israel, to help address the main constraints to growth, like water, energy and trade.

The UK is a key donor to UNRWA, providing essential humanitarian support to Palestinian refugees across its five zones of operation. In 2021 we provided over £27m in support to UNRWA, including £4.9m to their flash appeal following the Gaza conflict in May. Our annual contribution to their programme budget helps UNRWA provide education to over 533,000 children a year (half of them girls), and access to health services for 3.5m Palestinian refugees.

All information relevant to UK programming in the OPTs is available at: DevTracker Country Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) Summary Page (fcdo.gov.uk)”

Yours sincerely,

Levant and North Africa Department
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

Appendix F - Commitments vs disbursement 2017-2021 - Denmark support to Palestine

All commitments including Development Cooperation minus UNRWA

Country	State of Palestine	
Type	Commitment	
Frame responsible	All	Samlet All: 2,311,216,667
Project responsible	All	
Organisation	All	
Budget Account	All	
Channel of Delivery	All	
ProjectHierarchy	All	

Multimeasure	Column Labels					
Row Labels	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	Grand Total
121 Health, General	-4,800,000.00	4,800,000.00	4,800,000.00	3,200,000.00	3,200,000.00	11,200,000.00
130 Population Policies/Programmes & Reproductive Health			1,948,051.95	1,915,380.00	2,103,000.00	5,966,431.95
151 Government & Civil Society-general	81,889,779.33	4,731,800.93	6,139,779.33	3,539,779.31	38,000,000.00	134,301,138.90
152 Conflict, Peace & Security			-2,100,000.00		117,000,000.00	114,900,000.00
160 Other Social Infrastructure & Services	34,116,213.35	2,116,213.34	2,116,213.35	2,116,213.34		40,464,853.38
311 Agriculture	-1,500,000.00	4,500,000.00	15,500,000.00		83,000,000.00	101,500,000.00
321 Industry	89,700,000.00					89,700,000.00
720 Emergency Response	42,298,324.03	10,579,247.87	23,571,051.31	8,571,051.30	10,880,945.61	95,900,620.12
998 Unallocated / Unspecified	5,500,500.31	-657,747.69	-7,447,935.68	3,396,812.31	13,028,806.00	13,820,435.25
Grand Total	247,204,817.02	26,069,514.45	44,527,160.26	22,739,236.26	267,212,751.61	607,753,479.60

All Disbursement including Development Cooperation minus UNRWA

Country	State of Palestine
Type	Disbursement
Frame responsible	All
Project responsible	All
Organisation	All
Budget Account	All
Channel of Delivery	All
ProjectHierarchy	All

Samlet All: 2,722,348,520

Multimeasure	Column Labels					
Row Labels	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	Grand Total
121 Health, General	-4,787,447.24	4,787,447.24	4,800,000.00	3,200,000.00	3,200,000.00	11,200,000.00
130 Population Policies/Programmes & Reproductive Health			1,948,051.95	1,915,380.00	2,103,000.00	5,966,431.95
151 Government & Civil Society-general	38,829,407.17	34,927,429.65	31,289,024.70	25,664,210.21	30,564,725.20	161,274,796.93
152 Conflict, Peace & Security	1,054,538.19	21,169,906.20	15,732,726.69	51,482,889.56	70,865,076.85	160,305,137.49
160 Other Social Infrastructure & Services	5,060,835.93	2,116,213.34	2,226,968.19	2,116,213.34		11,520,230.80
220 Communications					-5,104.00	-5,104.00
311 Agriculture	30,502,943.09	37,170,548.00	30,142,699.14	50,843,739.88	21,664,364.01	170,324,294.12
321 Industry	20,000,000.00					20,000,000.00
430 Other Multisector		-44,192.40			44,192.40	
720 Emergency Response	42,296,686.75	25,579,247.87	8,571,051.31	8,571,051.30	10,807,250.18	95,825,287.41
998 Unallocated / Unspecified	5,244,017.05	3,581,116.75	5,187,957.22	3,818,248.70	1,326,279.83	19,157,619.55
Grand Total	138,200,980.94	129,287,716.65	99,898,479.20	147,611,732.99	140,569,784.47	655,568,694.25

UNRWA

Country	State of Palestine
Type	Commitment
Frame responsible	All
Project responsible	All
Sector hierarchy	All
Budget Account	All
Organisation	All
ProjectHierarchy	All

Samlet All: 2,311,216,667

Multimeasure	Column Labels				
Row Labels	2021	2019	2018	2017	Grand Total
United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees	26,097,848.00	1,009,812.00	854,560.00	1,028,806.00	28,991,026.00
Grand Total	26,097,848.00	1,009,812.00	854,560.00	1,028,806.00	28,991,026.00

UNRWA

Country	State of Palestine	
Type	Disbursement	
Frame responsible	All	Samlet All: 2,722,348,520
Project responsible	All	
Sector hierarchy	All	
Budget Account	All	
Organisation	All	
ProjectHierarchy	All	

Multimeasure	Column Labels					
Row Labels	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	Grand Total
United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees	26,089,242.33	3,496.37	1,018,573.74	910,448.05	1,794,201.80	29,815,962.29
Grand Total	26,089,242.33	3,496.37	1,018,573.74	910,448.05	1,794,201.80	29,815,962.29